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SIGNIFICANT LAW REVIEW ARTICLES
ANTITRUST LAW
BID DEPOSITORIES, by George H. Schueller, 58 Mich. Law Rev. 497 (Febru-
ary 1960).
This article examines the extent to which bid depository ar-
rangements may inhibit bid peddling and bid shopping without
violating federal antitrust laws.
A bid depository is a facility, which may be a trade organization or
some independent agency, which collects bids addressed by subcontractors
to general contractors, and keeps them closed and confidential until im-
mediately prior to the bid opening time of the general contract, purportedly
to inhibit bid peddling and bid shopping practices. These practices, although
condemned as unethical by the canons of some trade organizations, are in
fact forms of vigorous price competition, and as such, supported by national
antitrust policies and statutes. The author points out that in every instance
in which the Department of Justice has instituted antitrust proceedings
against participants, the bid deposits have had further anti-competitive
purposes or effects. Such depository plans have included per se violations
of the Sherman Act involving such things as price-fixing and group boycotts.
They have also included arrangements with labor or other groups for the
enforcement of the depository rules. Where depositories organize groups to
foreclose others from competing for business, there can be no doubt that they
violate the law. The same can not be clearly said with respect to depositories
who, without violating the Sherman Act per se, seek merely to prevent
bid peddling and shopping by the participants. The type of restrictive
depository rule regarded as encroaching upon freedom in business conduct
to such an extent as to unreasonably restrain trade, is considered in United
States v. Bakersfield Associated Plumbing Contractors Inc., a case equally
significant for its development of the kind of equitable relief which can be
afforded in such a situation.
The scope of inquiry of the article is primarily directed towards an
evaluation of this decision in terms of its likely impact in the bid depository
area—in view of the history of attempts to resolve the problem arising out of
bid depositories—on the Congress, the Department of Justice, and the federal
courts. The article contains a table of all antitrust cases, civil and criminal,
dealing with bid depositories prosecuted by the Department of Justice under
the Sherman Act. The tabulation indicates the various types of violations
involved and the specific kind of court action taken.
The author, an assistant chief in the trial section of the Antitrust
Division, points out that the Department of Justice has taken a stern but
not inflexible position in regard to depositories. Before legal action is
commenced, consideration is given to the particular attending circumstances
and equities. Bid shopping and peddling is not all bad, it being recognized
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that under some circumstances this type of dealing is beneficial or even
necessary. The burden is placed upon the adherents to show that it is a
reasonable depository plan designed to discourage irresponsible bargaining
techniques.
The Bakersfield decision has aroused considerable renewed interest
in, discussion of, and activity concerning bid depositories, as is evidenced
by recent expressions of the trade press and inquiries reaching the Anti-
trust Division. While there was appreciable action and interest in this area
commencing with the demise of the NRA codes and during the pre-war
years, the institution, immediately prior to the war, of numerous antitrust
actions involving bid depositories stifled enthusiasm for this device. The
question now raised is whether this will be changed by virtue of the Bakers-field decision.
DENNIS L. DITELBERG
Index Editor
THE EVISCERATION OF SECTION 5 OF THE CLAYTON ACT, by Russell Hardy,
Sr., 49 Geo. L. J. 44 (Fall 1960).
The former Special Assistant to the Attorney General in anti-
trust cases inquires into the difference in policy between Section 5
of the Clayton Act and the doctrine of estoppel by judgment, the
principles of which, incorporated in Section 5, determine those
matters of fact involved in government judgments in antitrust
litigation, civil or criminal, which are to be given prima facie effect
as evidence in a subsequent private suit. After analyzing those
decisions in which private parties have attempted to employ gov-
ernment judgments, consideration is given to the effect of the
resulting rules on the usefulness of Section 5 as an implement of
antitrust policy.
Despite the treble-damage provision of the Sherman Act, the history
of antitrust litigation prior to the enactment of Section 5 of the Clayton
Act reveals a paucity of successful litigation by private parties, due, in large
part, to the great difference in resources between a private victim and the
defendant, usually an inordinately powerful business combination. A valu-
able addition to the arsenal of the plaintiff in a private suit was provided
by Section 5 under which a government judgment or decree in a civil or
criminal antitrust action is ". . . prima fade evidence against such defendant
in any action or proceeding brought by any other party against such defend-
ant under said (antitrust) laws . . . as to all matters respecting which said
judgment or decree would be an estoppel as between the parties thereto."
The article carefully points out that Section 5 is not an estoppel statute
but a rule of evidence. The policy behind estoppel by judgment is the
necessity of finality in litigation while that behind Section 5 is the sup-
pression of restraints and monopolies. The principles and purpose of
estoppel, the author urges, should not be followed when to do so would
dilute the strength of Section 5 as a bulwark against antitrust infringement.
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The principles of estoppel by judgment are discussed for a clearer
insight into the method of determining what matters in the government
litigation may be used in evidence in the private suit and the difficulties
attending such a determination. The determination of the facts upon which
the judgment was founded is the task of the trial judge in the private suit.
This necessitates an examination not only of the record, proceedings, and
evidence in the case but also of extrinsic evidence and other appropriate
material.
In analyzing the cases decided since the enactment of the Clayton
Act, the author finds that trial and appellate courts have established such
erroneous and disastrous limitations on the force of the statute as: (1) a
judgment for the government may not be used in' support of a private
claim not precisely coincident in time with matters in the government
action; (2) a judgment, while proving the existence of an antitrust con-
spiracy, gives rise to no presumption in favor of the private plaintiff that
the conspiracy is continuing, but, on the contrary, to a presumption favorable
to the defendants that the conspiracy ended upon entry of judgment, even
though compliance therewith has not occurred and is, by the terms of the
judgment, postponed until some later date; (3) a judgment may not be
used in a private suit based on matters occurring at a place other than
that to which the judgment specifically refers; (4) a judgment based on
findings of a nationwide violation is not prima facie evidence that any part
of the violation occurred at a particular place; (5) a judgment may not be
used unless the private and government suits are based on the same subject
matter; and (6) no inference may be drawn in favor of a private litigant
from any facts proven by such a judgment.
The judicial justification for each of the rules is weighed in the balanCe
and found wanting, the author concluding that these rules—which result
from an inappropriate application of principles of estoppel in the construc-
tion of the statute, and the hostility of some judges to antitrust cases,
especially treble-damage and injunction suits—if left uncorrected, will





JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRATION: THE JUDICIAL ATTITUDE, by Frances T.
Freeman Jolet, 45 Cornell L. Q. 519 (Spring 1960).
The author, a member of the New York State Law Revision
Commission, inquires in this article into the recurring criticism that
judicial review has resulted in undue interference with the arbitra-
tion process. Her conclusion is that the charge of judicial intol-
erance is somewhat unjustified, and the judicial role, in its limited
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